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Abstract 
 
 
The U.S. federal government implements environmental, biofuels and crop insurance 
programs that influence land use. They are not well integrated in that cost savings from crop 
insurance subsidies are not acknowledged when screening land for retirement or when 
calculating the cost of land retirement programs. We identify and evaluate an optimal benefit 
index for enrollment in a land retirement program that includes a sub-index to rank land 
according to insurance subsidy savings. All else equal, land ranked higher in the Lorenz 
stochastic order should be retired first. 
 
Keywords: agro-environmental policy, budget, Conservation Reserve Program, crop failure, 
Environmental Benefit Index, Lorenz order. 
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Introduction 
The United States federal government influences land use in many ways. Perhaps most 
directly, it supports the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and other programs to remove 
land from agricultural production and directly influence environmental benefits from farmed 
land. The 2007 farm bill allows for about $5 billion per year in such expenditures over the 
period 2008-17. Through biofuels use mandates and other means, the federal government has 
increased demand for cropland. In addition, under the Agricultural Risk Protection Act 
(ARPA) of 2000 it provides subsidies on crop insurance. Over the years 2000-07, U.S. 
taxpayers have transferred about $11 billion to farmers in this way (Babcock 2008). With 
multiple goals that include transfers, land use policy design is inevitably a challenging 
endeavor where one difficulty is to integrate into a coherent framework disparate policy 
interventions that affect land use. 
Consider how land retirement and crop insurance programs integrate. The CRP is targeted 
at removing cropland from production if it performs sufficiently well on the program’s 
Environmental Benefits Index (EBI). Factors entering the EBI include benefits to wildlife, 
water quality metrics, air quality consequences, erosion propensity and carbon sequestration 
potential (Hajkowicz, Collins and Cattaneo 2009). Enrollment cost factors are also included 
where, ceteris paribus, land that commands higher market rent will perform worse on the index 
and so is less likely to be accepted for enrollment.  
Omitted from the index, however, is the reduction in premium subsidies from crop 
insurance that would occur were the land to be removed from production. This is an important 
omission, as a cursory inspection of any program enrollment map shows high concentration of 
enrolled acres in the southern Corn Belt, the eastern Dakotas, Montana, the southern Great 
Plains and parts of the Palouse (Ribaudo et al. 2001). These are in the main marginal cropland 
regions where CRP enrollment costs are low and benefits may be high. For example, these 
2 
lands tend to be erosion-prone and more vulnerable to nutrient losses that ultimately pollute 
water bodies. 
What makes these locations marginal for cropping and environmentally sensitive often also 
makes them poor crop insurance prospects (Lubowski et al. 2006). As one instance, low 
organic matter content renders soil susceptible to wind and water erosion. In addition, low 
organic matter soil is poorly aerated and incapable of retaining rainfall to buffer crops against 
drought (p. 70 in Smil 2001). Thus, low mean yield land typically also displays comparatively 
high yield variance as reflected in coefficients of variation (p. 103 in Woodard 2008). If crop 
insurance receives a percentage of premium subsidy as under ARPA, and even if it receives a 
fixed per acre subsidy as was the case before ARPA, then marginal but uncropped acres are 
likely to be drawn into production. In addition to placing constraints on attaining 
environmental goals, the policy will involve a cost to the budget.  
It should be no surprise then that the ratio of indemnities paid out over farmer premiums 
paid in during 2000-07 was above two in Oklahoma, Montana, Texas, Kansas and the Dakotas 
(Babcock 2008). The ratio was less than one in the prime cropland states of Iowa, Illinois and 
Indiana. Transfers are large, where total indemnities less farmer premiums paid over the period 
2000-07 exceeded $1 billion each for Texas, Kansas, North Dakota, and South Dakota.1 
Consistent with findings in the small body of work on the issue, Lubowski et al. (2006) 
identified a modest but definite impact of crop insurance subsidies in promoting cropping on 
environmentally sensitive land. 
Our concern is with the omission of crop insurance subsidies as an avoided cost when 
constructing an index to use for enrollment. There are two reasons this should be a concern. 
Although program fund sources differ, federal taxes spent and saved have equal weight when 
calculating the budget deficit. Secondly, were avoided crop insurance costs to be included in 
                                                 
1 Glauber (2004), over 1981-2003, and Woodard (2008), over 1980-2006, provide similar 
insurance loss data for the Corn Belt states. 
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the index, then incentives for optimal land allocation would be strengthened. Inclusion would 
mitigate dissonance across the suite of agro-environmental policies.  
This paper does four things. It identifies precisely how crop insurance savings should be 
included in a modified EBI. It studies the nature of the ordering that should be used to rank 
crop insurance savings from land retirement. It evaluates how the index should be weighted 
absent a metric for these savings. And it discusses why the EBI index omits avoided subsidy 
costs. 
 
Model 
The model used in this work is an extension of the standard constrained benefit maximization 
specification, as used in, e.g., Babcock et al. (1996), Newburn, Berck, and Merenlender 
(2006), and Feng et al. (2006). Define by {1,2, ... , }k K∈ ≡Ω  the kth acre of land, all of unit 
size which we set as one acre. The set of all subsets of Ω  is written as ( )ΩP . Environmental 
benefits arising from retirement amount to ke  while production costs avoided by placing the 
land in retirement equal kc . We write net benefits as k k kb e c= − . Therefore if set ( )⊆ ΩPS  is 
placed in retirement then net benefits amount to kk b∈∑ S .  
The land management planner faces a constraint and a cost when seeking to maximize the 
value of kk b∈∑ S . The constraint is the requirement that expected total forgone agricultural 
production equals level Q  where stochastic yield on the kth acre is kq  and mean yield is kμ . 
Formally, kkQ μ∈=∑ S . At the practical level, this constraint reflects pressure from animal 
agriculture, the biofuels industry and ultimately commodity end consumers regarding acres 
available for production. The cost is the social welfare deadweight loss from raising the funds 
used to retire the land. This has two components, where the first is rent kr  that would have to 
be paid to temporarily retire the land. But there are also savings that lower the level of funds 
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required. These savings arise from avoiding the cost of subsidizing crop insurance. 
We model the insurance indemnity as follows. The kth acre is insured for losses below 
yield kβμ  where 0β ≥  and the price paid is p . With expectation operator [ ]⋅E  over the kth 
acre yield distribution, the expected indemnity is [max( ,0)]k kp yβμ −E . Given subsidy rate s , 
the expected cost to the government is [max( ,0)]k ksp yβμ −E . The cost would be avoided 
were the land taken out of production. To be succinct we write ( ) [max( ,0)]k k kyδ β βμ= −E , 
or just kδ  when β  is understood to be fixed. 
Both rent kr  and government indemnity payments are transfers. If surpluses to all 
economic agents are weighted equally then the social cost of making these payments equals the 
deadweight loss associated with raising taxes. As is standard in the literature, write this as a 
price τ  so the net cost is  
(1) ( )( ) .k kk kr spτ δ β∈ ∈× −∑ ∑S S  
The land planner’s problem is2  
(2) ( ) ( )( )max ( ) ,k k k kk k k kb Q r spλ μ τ δ β∈ Ω ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈+ × − − × −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑S S S S SP  
where λ  is a Lagrange multiplier representing the shadow value of output. From (2) and 
writing  
(3) 
( )( ) ( ); ( , , ( )) , , ;k k kk k k k k k k
k k k
b rU b r sp b r δ ββ τ τ δ β δ β μ μ μ
⎛ ⎞= − + = ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
      
the inclusion criterion for the kth acre is  
                                                 
2 The standard approach is to maximize over a closed bounded parcel size interval, say, [0, ]kx , 
so that the problem is a mixed (discrete and continuous) linear program. Except for the last 
acre, interior solutions will not occur, so we have dropped the cumbersome notation associated 
with partial allocation of an acre and focus on solving a discrete linear program. 
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(4) 
all acre if ( ) ;
include none of acre if ( ) ;
some of acre if ( ) .
k
k
k
U
U
U
β λ
β λ
β λ
>⎧⎪⎪ <⎨⎪ =⎪⎩
 
We see then that three factors enter into the determination of ( )⊆ ΩPS . Acres having 
larger environmental benefits per unit of expected forgone production, i.e., larger kb

, are more 
likely to merit inclusion in the retirement program. Acres with larger rental cost per unit 
expected forgone production, i.e., larger kr
 , are less likely to merit inclusion. If the social cost 
of raising taxes, τ , is high then kr  will weigh heavily when compared with an acre’s kb

 value 
in the inclusion decision. Finally acres with higher expected subsidy costs per unit expected 
forgone production, i.e., higher ( )kδ β

, should be included. Here the weighting relative to kb

 is 
spτ  and not just τ  so that percent subsidy and price that crop losses receive also matter. 
 
Insurance Loss Index 
Defining ( )kδ β

 as the Insurance Loss Index (ILI), we may write  
(5) 
[max( ,0)]( ) .k kk
k
yβμδ β μ
−= E  
Several comments are in order concerning how yield affects this measure and, so, index kU . 
First, suppose that the jth and kth acres are stochastically ordered such that the jth is larger in 
the first-order sense.3 Then j kμ μ≥ . But we cannot establish a priori whether 
[max( ,0)] [max( ,0)]j j k ky yβμ βμ− ≤ −E E  or ( ) ( )j kδ β δ β≤
 
.  
To explore the issue further, consider a two-point yield distribution for the jth acre. The 
                                                 
3 Distribution ( )jF ⋅  is larger than distribution ( )kF ⋅  in the first-order sense whenever [ ( )]jg yE  
[ ( )]kg y≥ E  for all increasing functions ( )g ⋅ . Alternatively, ( ) ( )j kF y F y≤  on the union of 
supports for y . Stochastic dominance orderings are explained in chap. 3 of Gollier (2001).  
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distribution has yield ljy  with probability (0,1)π ∈  and yield hjy  with probability 1 π−  where 
h l
j jy y> . The kth acre distribution has yield l lk jy y=  with probability π  and yield h hk jy y φ= +  
with probability 1 π−  where 0φ > . We refer to the distribution shift from jth to kth acre as an 
upper stretch because the high yield is shifted whereas the low yield remains fixed. It is a 
restricted version of first-order stochastic dominance.4  
Result 1: If the kth acre first-order dominates the jth acre by an upper stretch then ( )kδ β ≥

 
( ) [0,1]jδ β β∀ ∈

.  
 
Requirement 1β ≤  is not onerous in that 1β >  would involve a yield guarantee larger than 
mean yield. The result has yield becoming more variable while mean yield increases, where the 
former effect dominates to drive up the ILI.  
Alternatively, consider the same two-point yield distribution for the jth acre but let the kth 
acre distribution have yield l lk jy y φ= +  with probability π  and yield h hk jy y=  with probability 
1 π−  where (0, )h lj jy yφ∈ − . We refer to the distribution shift from jth to kth acre as a lower 
contraction, and it is also a restricted version of first-order dominance. 
Result 2: If the kth acre first-order dominates the jth acre by a lower contraction then 
( ) ( ) [0,1]k jδ β δ β β≤ ∀ ∈
 
.  
 
The result has yield becoming less variable while mean yield increases, and in light of (5) it 
may not be a surprise to learn that the dominating shift drives down the ILI. The pair of results 
clarify that, ceteris paribus, ranking acres for land retirement using the first-order dominance 
criterion may not be efficient.  
                                                 
4 Where not obvious, results are demonstrated in the appendix. 
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Suppose instead that the jth and kth acres are stochastically ordered such that the kth’s yield 
distribution is a mean-preserving contraction relative to that for the jth acre.5  
Result 3: If the kth acre dominates the jth acre by a mean-preserving spread then ( )kδ β ≥

 
( ) [0,1]jδ β β∀ ∈

.  
 
Upon controlling for the mean, the more risky distribution should be ranked higher for 
inclusion in the land retirement program.  
We also ask what effect an independent risk source would have on whether to retire an 
acre. For example suppose two acres are equivalent in all ways except that one is on a flood 
plain and the other is not. Let 
dist
k jy By=  where B , independent of jy , is Bernoulli having value 
1 with probability π  and value 0 (i.e., the flood event) otherwise. The distributions of jy  and 
ky  are not ordered by a mean-preserving spread as the mean is not preserved. The distributions 
are not ordered by the upper stretch or lower contraction conditions either as the distribution of 
jy  is arbitrary and not two-point. We have the following: 
Result 4: Under the above representation of disaster risk, ( ) ( ) 0k jδ β δ β β≥ ∀ ≥
 
.  
 
Being exposed to that independent risk, the kth acre of land is indeed riskier and, ceteris 
paribus, should be included in the retirement program whenever the jth acre is. 
 
                                                 
5 Distribution ( )jF ⋅  is a mean-preserving contraction (mpc) when compared with distribution 
( )kF ⋅  whenever [ ( )] [ ( )]j kg y g y≤E E  for all convex functions ( )g ⋅ . The reverse of an mpc is a 
mean-preserving spread (mps), meaning ( )jF ⋅  is an mps when compared with ( )kF ⋅  whenever 
[ ( )] [ ( )]j kg y g y≥E E  for all convex functions ( )g ⋅ . 
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Lorenz Order 
While appealing to standard stochastic dominance tools in the economics of uncertainty, the 
comments made to this point concerning how an acre’s yield risk profile affects the ILI are not 
precise in that results 1-4 do not cover all cases. The conditions for the ILI to increase are 
sufficient but they are not necessary. Linear homogeneity of the function max( ,0)x  allows us 
to identify the precise stochastic order that ranks acres across all values of 0β ≥ . From (5) we 
may write  
(6) ( ) [max( ,0)]; .kk k k
k
yz zδ β β μ= − =

E  
The Lorenz stochastic order provides much insight on this relation. Shaked and 
Shanthikumar (2007, p. 116) report: 
Definition 1: For non-negative random variables jy  and ky , ky  is said to dominate jy  in 
the Lorenz order (written as Lork jy y≥ ) whenever the mean-normalized random variable 
/k ky μ  is a mean-preserving spread of /j jy μ . 
 
The stochastic ordering is equivalent to the Lorenz order so familiar to students of income 
distribution orderings (Atkinson 1970). We are considering yields, non-negative random 
variables. For non-negative random variables, Arnold (1986, p. 37) reports that Lork jy y≥  and 
( ) ( ) 0k jδ β δ β β≥ ∀ ≥
 
 imply each other. Equivalently, Lork jy y≥  whenever [ ( / )]k kg y μ ≥E  
[ ( / )]j jg y μE  for all continuous convex functions ( )g ⋅ . Therefore, relation (6) allows us to 
state: 
Result 5: If Lork jy y≥  then ( ) ( ) 0k jδ β δ β β≥ ∀ ≥
 
.  
 
Lorenz curves provide equivalent information for mass distributions, not probability 
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distributions. These curves have been applied elsewhere as a tool for analyzing and explaining 
the effects of environmental programs. Babcock et al. (1996, 1997) use them to compare 
budget effectiveness across disparate CRP enrollment criteria. Groot (2009) uses them to 
compare country population shares with global greenhouse gas emission shares.  
Some examples can illustrate how the order ranks yield distributions. If 0ky ≥  and 
dist
jy =  
ky θ+ , 0θ > , then Lork jy y≥  and the kth acre scores higher on the index for acres to be 
retired.6 This makes sense as the kth acre more readily satisfies the commodity supply 
condition while being possessed of the same variability. Alternatively, if 
dist
j ky yθ= , 0θ > , then 
( ) ( ) 0j kδ β δ β β≡ ∀ ≥
 
 and the distributions are equal under the ordering. We will have reason 
to comment on this observation at a later point. 
More generally, Wilfling (1996) has considered the pair of positive, continuous, increasing 
functions ( )g r  and ( )h r  on 0r ≥  with ( ) 0g r >  and ( ) 0h r >  on 0r > . If ( ) / ( )h r g r  is 
increasing then Lor( ) ( )h r g r≥ . For example, let ( )j g gy g r rαθ τ= = +  and ( )k hy h r rαθ= =  
hτ+  where parameter set { , , , , }g h g hθ θ τ τ α  is positive and 0r ≥  is growing season rainfall on 
arid land. Then the derivative of ( ) / ( ) [ ] / [ ]h h g gh r g r r r
α αθ τ θ τ= + +  has the sign of /h hθ τ −  
/g gθ τ . So if / /h h g gθ τ θ τ>  then Lorj ky y≥  and the jth acre is the better candidate for 
including in the program. 
One may also apply Wilfling’s observation to the role of inputs on the ILI. Writing x  as an 
input, let output be ( , )f r x  with r  random, and we study 2 1( , ) / ( , )f r x x f r x x= =  where 
2x >  1x . The yield distribution under 2x  is larger (smaller) in the Lorenz order and so more 
(less) costly to subsidize per bushel forgone, if 
                                                 
6 Here 
dist
1 2x x=  means that the distributions of 1x  and 2x  are equal almost everywhere. 
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2 1ln[ ( , )] / ( ) ln[ ( , )] /f r x x r f r x x r∂ = ∂ > < ∂ = ∂ . When x  is chosen over an interval, say, 
[ , ]x x , this requires that 2 ln[ ( , )] / ( ) 0f r x r x∂ ∂ ∂ > <  over the interval, i.e., that the production 
function be log-supermodular (log-submodular) (Athey 2002). Intuitively, a higher value of x  
makes the land more rainfall sensitive. The yield distribution is more variable in proportional 
terms, where proportionality normalizes away the effects of a shift in the mean yield, as does 
the Lorenz ordering. 
 
Relation to Just-Pope Technology 
In a widely applied innovation, Just and Pope (1979) endogenized yield riskiness by 
representing input-conditioned yield as ( ) ( ) ( )y x g x h x ε= + . Here [ ] 0ε ≡E , ε  follows some 
distribution function ( )F ε , x  is a vector (possibly scalar) of inputs while ( )g x  and ( )h x  are 
assumed to be positive. If ( )h x  is increasing in an input then that input is held to be risk 
increasing.  
Since [ ( )] ( )y x g x=E , it follows that the input-conditioned ILI is 
(7) [max( ( ) ( ),0)]( ; ) [max( ( ) ,0)],
( )
g x y xx m x
g x
βδ β ψ ε−= = − E E  
where 1ψ β= −  and ( ) ( ) / ( ) 0m x h x g x= > . If ( )m x  is increasing then an increase in the level 
of inputs induces a mean-preserving spread in random variable ( )m x ε  and so increases the 
value of ( ; )xδ β . More formally, we can write the result as follows.  
Result 6: Consider the Just-Pope technology as presented above. If b ax x≥  then ( )m x  
increasing implies ( ; ) ( ; )b ax xδ β δ β≥
 
 while ( )m x  decreasing implies ( ; ) ( ; )b ax xδ β δ β≤
 
.  
 
An increasing ( )m x  function would suggest that a restriction on inputs, perhaps due to 
environmental damage considerations, would decrease the ILI. The restriction would make the 
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acre less costly in terms of insurance subsidy costs per expected bushel forgone. But of course 
the expected cost of attaining a given expected yield would increase.7 
If we suppose that the Just-Pope technology is appropriate, then do inputs have a uniformly 
positive or negative ( )m x  function? Often evidence on the ( )m x  function as reported in the 
literature is insufficient to inform on the function’s monotonicity status. A set of functional 
forms that allow for this arises when both ( )g x  and ( )h x  are Cobb-Douglas, for then the ratio 
is also Cobb-Douglas and monotone without regard to the relevant input domain.  
Using Day’s (1965) classic data set on yield and nitrogen level, Just and Pope (1979) do 
estimate this technology for corn and oats experimental plot data. For corn the estimation is 
0.353 0.127y Ax Bx ε= +  where 0A >  and 0B >  are coefficients and x  represents nitrogen. Thus, 
nitrogen is risk increasing in the Just-Pope sense. Nonetheless, 0.127 0.353 0.226( ) /m x x x x−= = , a 
decreasing function, so that the estimates suggest an increase in nitrogen reduces the ILI. For 
oats, 0.310 0.200y Ax Bx ε= +  so that nitrogen also reduces the ILI even though it would be viewed 
as a risk increasing input. 
 
Consequences of Excluding ILI from EBI 
Consider now the case when direct information on ( )kδ β  is unavailable. Assuming a 
continuous distribution on acre attributes, and so dropping subscript k, we suppose that 
variable set ( , , )b r δ   is joint normal with means ( , , )b r δς ς ς , deviations 
( , , ) ( , , )b r b rb rδ δη η η ς ς δ ς= − − −
   and covariances  
                                                 
7 To also accommodate social planner choice over inputs, problem (2) should be extended. The 
maximization should be over S  and x  where kb , kμ , and ( )kδ β  depend on x . Benefits on 
farmed acres should also be included, as should the cost of x . 
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(8) 
bb br b
br rr r
b r
δ
δ
δ δ δδ
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
Letting 2 0bb rr brχ σ σ σ= − > , then the conditional mean of δ

 is given as (p. 34 in Tong 1990) 
(9) | | | |[ | , ] ; ; .b rr br r r bb br bb r b r b r b r r bb r δ δ δ δδ δ δ δ δ
σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σδ ς ρ η ρ η ρ ρχ χ
− −= + + ≡ ≡ E  
Here, |b rδρ  and |r bδρ  are, respectively, the r- and b-conditioned partial correlations between δ  
and the other observed variable. Insert into expectation of index function (3) conditional on 
knowing b

 and r  to obtain  
(10) 
| |
[ | , ] [ | , ]
= (1 ) ( 1) .b r b r b r b r
U b r b r sp b r
sp sp spδ δ δ
τ τ δ
τ ρ η ρ τη ς τ ς τς
= − +
+ + − + + −
    E E
 
Suppose, as is likely to be the case, that | 0b rδρ >  (Lubowski et al. 2006). This means that 
the rent-conditioned partial correlation between environmental benefits per unit forgone output 
and the ILI is positive. Then the partially informed index should place more weight on 
environmental benefits than should the fully informed index in order to use b  as a signal 
indicating a large δ  value. The measure of environmental benefits needs to take on the weight 
of the correlation when no explicit measure of insurance subsidy costs is included in the index. 
Suppose too, as is also likely to be the case, that | 0r bδρ <  (Lubowski et al. 2006). Then the rent 
costs in the partially informed index should be weighed more heavily as a negative component 
than when insurance costs are included. This is because low-rent land suggests land with high 
insurance subsidy cost so that enticing low-rent land to enroll likely has a two-fold benefit. 
 
Why This Design? 
Two somewhat puzzling features of the CRP are (a) why land is enrolled entirely or not at all, 
rather than use an agro-environmental scheme whereby production occurs but some production 
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practices are proscribed in return for compensation (Fischer et al. 2008); and (b) why saved 
crop insurance subsidies are not accounted for. We ask whether these features have arisen from 
some recognition of problems that would arise were the situation otherwise. A review of the 
literature suggests that these questions may be related. Although the incentives design problem 
at hand, one of screening acres, does not involve moral hazard and is not really one of adverse 
selection, the principal-agent framework comes to mind.  
Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (2000, 2002) have used this approach to 
identify cases where it is better not to reward for readily measured dimensions of performance 
if another dimension is less readily measured. This is because one may get what can be 
measured well at the expense of losing what can be measured poorly. So perhaps it is that 
measures of subsidy losses are too noisy, or that inclusion of such measures would distort 
given the absence of some measures on important dimensions that are correlated.  
That non-zero correlations exist between important dimensions to the services provided by 
retired land is clear enough. What is less clear is why this might motivate exclusion of a 
measure on insurance losses. It can hardly be that a measure on insurance losses is considered 
too noisy. The government has long histories of yield and loss performances at levels less 
aggregated than the county level, and often at the field level. Such data are used for rate-setting 
by crop insurance companies that provide the contracts that the government subsidizes. In 
addition, measures on environmental benefits (e.g., carbon sequestration) are included even 
though the scientific foundation for these measures is as yet far from complete.  
This principal-agent literature also seeks to understand why outside activities on job time 
are sometimes proscribed rather than let output incentives implicitly penalize non-output 
activities. Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1991) argue that this can be because it is easier to prohibit 
an action entirely than to allow some of it but attempt to monitor and control the extent. There 
may be some merit to this reasoning when it is applied to, say, an upper bound on fertilizer or 
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pesticide application rates or use of no-till cultivation. But agro-environmental schemes that do 
precisely this have been in place in European Union countries for many years, apparently 
without widespread compliance problems (Baylis et al. 2008).  
Whether these restrictions increase risk in the sense of the Lorenz order is not clear. 
Considerable research has come to ambiguous conclusions on whether more nitrogen generates 
a more variable distribution (Sheriff 2005) whereas it is almost certainly true that more 
nitrogen increases mean yield. In light of observations made concerning equation (5), if we 
assume that nitrogen has no effect on yield variability then empirical evidence tilts toward the 
hypothesis that more nitrogen induces a yield distribution that is less dispersed in the Lorenz 
order sense. And, as previously mentioned, the Just-Pope (1979) analysis of Day’s data set 
suggests that nitrogen reduces risk in the Lorenz order sense for corn and oats.  
Pesticides almost certainly increase mean yield. At first glance one may also posit that 
pesticides reduce yield variability in that they reduce the probability and extent of bad state 
outcomes while having no effect in good state outcomes. The situation would be similar to a 
lower contraction, as studied in Result 2. This would mean that pesticide use should reduce 
dispersion in the Lorenz order sense. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1994), however, suggest that 
the matter is more complicated because overall crop growing conditions may correlate 
positively with the extent of the pest problem to be controlled. So the effect of pesticide use 
may more closely parallel Result 1 instead. Hurd (1994), for California cotton, and Shankar, 
Bennett and Morse (2008), for South African cotton, are among several works finding no 
significant effect of pesticides on yield variability. If pesticides increase mean yield and have 
no effect on variability then the ILI index will likely decline with an increase in their use.  
On balance, we conclude that restrictions on the use of inputs that are protective in function 
would likely increase the cost of an insurance subsidy policy. It may be that, rather than restrict 
input use when producing on land that is marginal as cropland, is environmentally sensitive, 
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and has high yield variability given output level, it would be better to remove the land from 
production entirely. These arguments still do not explain why measures of insurance losses are 
excluded from the index. 
Commencing with an assumed need in a political economy to compensate growers in the 
event of a poor harvest, Innes (2003) infers that any pre-harvest commitment not to do so is not 
credible. This is largely consistent with the history of U.S. federal disaster relief interventions. 
In his model, post-harvest intervention will take the form of revenue support. Yield takes the 
form of k k kyα θ  where 0kα > , 0ky > , and 0kθ >  are kth acre productivity, planned output or 
intensity decision, and multiplicative random component, respectively. There is no reference to 
environmental benefits from retiring land or from not farming it as intensively. Relative to 
efficient laissez faire, a positive probability of intervention when kθ  is low will draw marginal, 
but untilled, land into production. It will also reduce the incentive to farm land intensively.  
To address these inefficiencies Innes suggests an integrated program of (a) revenue 
insurance with a 100% subsidy, since political intervention is inevitable; plus (b) coupled crop 
price support to offset the moral hazard effect arising from revenue insurance; plus (c) a 
participation fee to screen out (i.e., retire) inefficient low kα  acres that were drawn into 
production because of the state-contingent income support. The revenue insurance can also be 
viewed as crop insurance since price is non-stochastic in his model. The package can deliver 
first-best.  
Innes notes that this policy package can also, at a stretch, motivate the CRP. The 
participation fee stick is not politically feasible. But it could be replaced by the carrot of a 
buyout program using an environmental criterion index since the environmental criteria are 
generally strongly correlated with low-productivity land. As he recognizes, this interpretation 
reaches outside his model, where the government’s initial objective function places no weight 
on environmental objectives. But his insights are likely to be robust to any realistically 
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calibrated model allowing for environmental benefits. 
Innes’s well-crafted model sidesteps the issue of choosing acres to retire in light of social 
welfare losses due to insurance subsidy costs. This is because yield specification k k kyα θ  has a 
constant ILI, regardless of acre chosen where this point was made under Result 5 above. Being 
a constant over acres in an index such as (3), it would be irrelevant. The issue we address is 
silent in Innes’s model as the index used to sort land is unidimensional. But this is not reality, 
where a multitude of empirical studies attest that yield standard deviation per expected bushel 
produced varies over space, e.g., Kucharik and Ramankutty (2005).  
Perhaps the most likely reason insurance subsidy losses are excluded in the EBI calculation 
is that the connection is not recognized in political calculations. Environmental and risk 
management programs have traditionally had different administrative structures and distinct 
parties recognized as interested. Perceptions on the need for policy innovations differ over time 
so that the items seldom enter the same debate.  
 
Conclusion 
The intent of this article is to promote a better understanding of the consequences of coherence 
among policies that affect land use. It shows how avoided crop insurance subsidy costs should 
be calculated for entry as a cost consideration in an environmental benefit index. The potential 
benefits of doing so are two-fold: to assist in managing the total cost of these programs and to 
better screen land into their best use. The Lorenz order was identified to best rank yield 
distributions over candidate acres for inclusion in a retirement program. Accurate index values 
for use at the acre level would be difficult to identify. But this is also true of environmental 
indices that are used. Empirical methods for comparing distributions in the Lorenz order sense 
are well developed (Bhattacharya 2007; Bresson 2009). These methods may provide practical 
guidance on how to modify land retirement enrollment procedures.  
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Appendix 
Demonstration of Result 1: The setting implies  
(A1) 
max[ ,0] (1 )max[ ,0]
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Note that [0,1]β ∈  ensures (1 ) (1 )j j jβμ β π φ φ βμ βμ β π φ+ − − ≤ ≤ + − . Write A =  
[0, (1 ) )jβμ β π φ φ+ − − , [ (1 ) , )j jB βμ β π φ φ βμ= + − − , [ , (1 ) )j jC βμ βμ β π φ= + − , and 
[ (1 ) , )jD βμ β π φ= + − ∞ . There are many cases that need to be considered, some of which 
turn out to be impossible. The cases in which hjy A B∈ ∪  are impossible since that would 
mean that j jμ βμ< , ruled out by [0,1]β ∈ . This leaves  
Case 1:  
l
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Case 2:  
l
jy C∈  and hjy C D∈ ∪  
Case 3:  
l
jy D∈  and hjy D∈  
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Case 2: Here,  
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Case 3: Here,  
(A4) ( ) 0; ( ) 0.j kδ β δ β= =
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Thus, all cases have ( ) ( ) [0,1]k jδ β δ β β≥ ∀ ∈
 
 as asserted. 
Demonstration of Result 2: The setting implies  
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It must be that h hj k jy y βμ βπφ= ≥ +  for otherwise we could not have k jμ μ πφ= + , as 
required in light of the lower contraction attribute. And it must also be that lj jy μ πφ< +  for 
otherwise lj jy φ μ πφ+ > +  and k jμ μ πφ> + , where jμ πφ+  must equal kμ  by construction. 
Write [0, )jE βμ βπφ φ= + − , [ , )j jF βμ βπφ φ βμ= + − , [ , )j jG βμ βμ βπφ= + , and H =  
[ , )jβμ βπφ+ ∞  where hjy H∈  and ljy H∉ . The cases we need to consider are 
Case I: ljy E∈  and hjy H∈  Case II: ljy F∈  and hjy H∈  Case III: ljy G∈  and hjy H∈  
 
Case I: Here,  
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Case II: Here,  
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(A8) ( ) 0; ( ) 0.j kδ β δ β= =
 
Thus ( ) ( ) [0,1]k jδ β δ β β≤ ∀ ∈
 
 in all cases, as asserted. 
Demonstration of Result 3: This follows immediately from (5). Since k jμ μ= , the 
denominator does not change. Since k jβμ βμ=  in the numerator, the mean-preserving spread 
increases the expected value of the convex max[ ,0]⋅  function in the numerator.  
Demonstration of Result 4: We have j kμ πμ=  so that independence secures 
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